4 corpus callosum, which connects the two cerebral hemispheres of the brain and which enables them to communicate directly with one another. The procedure has typically been used to alleviate epileptic seizures. It has been found in experiments on hemispheric commissurotomy that when different sensory stimuli are presented to each of the hemispheres, one hemisphere could be unaware of what was presented to the other hemisphere. 6 The upshot of such studies is that they seem to suggest that one's consciousness could be divided.
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On this basis, McMahan hypothesizes that if a commissurotomy was performed at birth and each hemisphere was then for many years presented with different stimuli, while the other was anaesthetized, such a procedure could produce two different minds, each with a different set of experiences, dispositions, beliefs, and memories. 8 McMahan argues that if this happens, then there would be two people coexisting, but there would only be one organism. Again, according to McMahan, since there is no reason to think that such a being would be fundamentally different from us, this would also suggest that we are not essentially organisms. Call this the Modified Commissurotomy Case.
In this paper, I would like to consider McMahan's two cases against the Organism
View and show that in fact, they do not undermine it. Since it is possible to devise more
McMahanian-type cases, another aim of this paper is to give a more general solution to these kinds of cases. To do this, I begin with an account of the Organism View.
II. An Account of the Organism View
Organisms are beings that have the capacities to carry on certain life processes. Some such processes may include metabolism, which is the capacity to break down substances and convert them to other substances that can be used by the body; growth, which is the capacity to increase the size of existing cells and the number of cells; assimilation, which is the capacity to absorb substances that are chemically different from those found in the body; responsiveness, which is the capacity to detect and respond to changes outside or inside the body; movement, which is the capacity to move the whole body, parts of the body such as organs, single cells, or even structures inside cells; and reproduction, which is the capacity to form new cells for growth, repair, or replacement or the formation of a new individual. Other life processes may include respiration, digestion, absorption, circulation, excretion, differentiation, and so on. To understand what it means for the capacity to regulate and coordinate metabolic and other life processes to be permanently gone, it is worth distinguishing between temporary and permanent organismic discontinuity. 10 Temporary organismic discontinuity may occur when, for example, a person has a heart seizure or falls into a coma, so that the capacity to coordinate and regulate the life processes stops, but it is possible to intervene externally in order to regain organismic continuity. Permanent organismic discontinuity occurs when it is no longer possible to regain organismic continuity by any means. In the case of temporary organismic discontinuity, the numerical identity of the individual would still persist, because the coordinating and regulating capacity of the various life processes, which is lost and regained, remains the same. In the case of permanent organismic discontinuity, the individual would be considered dead, since the capacity to coordinate and regulate the various life processes would no longer be there, that is, it would be permanently gone.
To illustrate the Organism View, let us consider a bacterium, which is typically regarded as essentially an organism. Indeed, the starting point of a bacterium's existence can be traced to the beginnings of its ability to regulate and coordinate its various life processes such as assimilation, growth, and so on. This is usually a point after binary fission, when a bacterium is capable of independent existence. In addition, as long as the bacterium is able to continue to regulate and coordinate its metabolic and other life processes, the bacterium is regarded to be persisting as numerically the same bacterium.
Hence, while the bacterium may leak enzymes out of its cell membranes into the environment (in order to break down various tissues and molecules into proteins and cellulose so that they would be small enough to enter into the bacterium's cell membrane), as long as the same capacity is keeping the bacterium functioning as an integrated whole, the bacterium persists, since there is organismic continuity. Finally, the bacterium may at some point cease to be able to coordinate and regulate its various life processes. This may occur if it dies or if binary fission occurs, where it splits into two daughter bacteria. In either case, there would be permanent organismic discontinuity and the original bacterium would have ceased to exist. The bacterium case thus illustrates how the Organism View can account for the numerical identity of a bacterium.
There are good reasons to believe that we also are essentially organisms. For one thing, the Organism View seems perfectly adequate for explaining the numerical identity of many beings that are non-human. Indeed, it is fairly uncontroversial to hold that bacteria, plants and lower non-conscious animals are numerically identical to their organisms. 11 That is, we do not think that plants and lower non-conscious animals are essentially something-other-than-organisms and that they stand in certain relations to their organisms in the way that, according to some philosophers, we stand to our 11 Some might wonder why I do not use lower conscious animals as examples. The reason is that Peter Unger has argued that our intuition about brain transplantation in the case of human beings should apply to lower conscious animals as well ("The Survival of the Sentient," op. cit). It seems to me that other advocates of the Psychological View could also make such a move. Anticipating this, I therefore use nonconscious animals instead of lower conscious ones in order to avoid presupposing any element of the Psychological View.
organisms, that is, one of non-identity. Given that the Organism View explains so well the numerical identity of many beings that are non-human, and given that we are not very different from these organisms in that, like them, we too coordinate and regulate various life processes, there is a prima facie case for believing that the Organism View should also be able to explain the numerical identity of human beings.
Also, the Organism View captures many of our common intuitions about what we essentially are. According to this view, we begin to exist when we have the capacity to regulate and coordinate our metabolic and other life processes. As commonly interpreted, this means that we typically begin to exist as embryos, since the capacity to regulate the various life processes typically begins to exist at this point, when the embryo coordinates its own division and growth to create a more specialized individual. 12 The
Organism View also says that we persist as long as there is organismic continuity, which is the continuing ability to regulate and coordinate our metabolic and other life processes.
Hence, on this view, we are numerically identical to the infants that once existed, and we would be numerically identical to human beings in a persistent vegetative state, as long as there is organismic continuity between us and them. Finally, this view says that we cease to be when we are no longer able to regulate and coordinate these functions. So on this view, we cease to exist when we are dead, since a dead body is not able to regulate and 12 Eric Olson, an advocate of an Organism View, and some others have argued that this implication need not follow from the Organism View. I argue elsewhere that the Organism View does have this implication. In particular, I argue that the zygote survives as a two-cell organism, because growing by increasing cell numbers still involves coordinating various life processes. For example, in order for the embryo to grow by increasing cell numbers, the embryo must undergo mitosis, which involves duplicating genetic information, and assimilating and metabolizing necessary materials. Moreover, I argue that unlike a dividing amoeba, the daughter cells of the embryo will not just wander off, but will communicate with one another in order to coordinate further development. Indeed, if one of the cells in the embryo is removed, the other cells will coordinate to replace the cell so that further development can continue. Hence, the kind of coordination of life processes involved in embryonic divisions is sufficient for the embryo to be considered as a single organism.
coordinate metabolic and other life processes, which means that there is no organism there, and there is no organismic continuity between us and the dead bodies. Given that the Organism View seems to be able to account adequately for many of our intuitions about what we are essentially, there are reasons to believe in its validity.
Here it is worth noting that establishing what we are essentially does not automatically tell us how we should treat beings that are numerically identical to us at various segments of our lives. For example, someone in a deep coma may very well be numerically identical to us (on both the Organism View and the Psychological View, since there is organismic continuity and since the cerebral hemisphere where particular mental states and consciousness reside could still be intact). However, it does not follow that this person should be treated in the same manner as a normal healthy adult human being, if it really is the case that the person in a deep coma may have no prospect of ever waking up again and being able to pursue a life worth living.
III. The Dicephalus Case and the Modified Commissurotomy Case
McMahan's cases of dicephalus and hemispheric commissurotomy are intended to challenge the Organism View. In both cases, the aim is to show that because there are two persons and only one organism, therefore, persons are not numerically identical to their organisms.
In response to the Dicephalus Case, it may be said that there are in fact two organisms, although they may not be completely independent organisms. In most cases of dicephalus, it is possible to identify functioning organs for two organisms. For example, in McMahan's example of Abigail and Brittany Hensel, each twin has her own stomach and heart; they have distinct brainstems and distinct spines that are only joined at the hips; and they have partially distinct organs that are united. This suggests that in fact, there are two organisms here although they are not fully independent organisms.
Moreover, in most if not all actual cases of dicephalic twinning, metaphysically considered, it is the case that they arose out of two distinct embryos, but that during the twinning process, the cleaving of the two embryos was not completed. side of the body may wither completely. If so, one may be able to claim that there are two organisms in existence. Consider a possible parallel. Suppose one takes a hydra and cuts its head partially into two. As it is known, a two headed hydra would be created, given the hydra's regenerative ability. More importantly, there would now be two locations, sometimes called 'head activation potentials' that can coordinate life processes. 21 When this happens, one may be able to interpret this as the beginning of two organisms, albeit two partially fused organisms. Similarly then, the Modified Commissurotomy Case may be the beginning of an organismic split in a human being.
Normally this is not possible in higher animals. Perhaps this is why we resist thinking Moreover, since someone could continue to offer variations of such a case, it is worthwhile considering whether there can be a general solution for them.
To start, we might note that van Inwagen may have a difficult time explaining the Extreme Case. As we said earlier, van Inwagen believes that the core of a human organism is the control center that regulates and coordinates various activities of its various parts. Since the regulatory functions of the brain are localized not in the cerebrum but in the brainstem, and since there is only one brainstem in this case, van
Inwagen should say that there is just one organism in the Extreme Case. example, is typically an equal division. An example of unequal division might be the budding of a hydra. Finally, one can distinguish between complete or incomplete 24 Indeed, van Inwagen says that a cerebrum supported by an external life-support system would not constitute an organism, and hence that one could not survive as a detached cerebrum (Material Beings, 
